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ABSTRACT
Personalization is pervasive in the online space as, when
combined with learning, it leads to higher efficiency
and revenue by allowing the most relevant content to
be served to each user. However, recent studies sug-
gest that such personalization can propagate societal
or systemic biases, which has led to calls for regula-
tory mechanisms and algorithms to combat inequality.
Here we propose a rigorous algorithmic framework
that allows for the possibility to control biased or dis-
criminatory personalization with respect to sensitive
attributes of users without losing all of the benefits of
personalization.
1 INTRODUCTION
News and social media feeds, product recommenda-
tion, online advertising and other media that pervades
the internet is increasingly personalized. Content se-
lection algorithms take data and other information as
input, and – given a user’s properties and past behav-
ior – produce a personalized list of content to display
[3, 11, 13, 17] (see Figure 1). This personalization leads
to higher utility and efficiency both for the platform,
which can increase revenue by selling targeted adver-
tisements, and also for the user, who sees content more
directly related to their interests [8, 10].
However, it is now known that such personalization
may result in propagating or even creating biases that
can influence decisions and opinions. Recently, field
studies have shown that user opinions about political
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Figure 1: The content selection algorithm decides
what to show to the user based on their properties
and the feedback received from similar users. Dif-
ferent colors represent different types of content,
e.g., news stories that lean republican vs. demo-
crat. Properties could be the gender, browser, lo-
cation or friends of the user. Feedback could be
past likes, purchases or follows.
candidates can be manipulated by biasing rankings of
search results [7]. Similar concerns appear in other
settings; e.g., it has been shown that ranking and clas-
sification algorithms can discriminate in online search
results [4, 16] and allow for gender inequality in serving
targeted advertising for high-paying jobs [6, 8, 23]. As
over two-thirds of American adults consume news on-
line on social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter
[18], and users are more likely to trust higher ranked
search results [20], the potential impact of changing
how social media ranks content is immense.
One approach to eliminate such biases is to hide cer-
tain user properties so that they cannot be used for per-
sonalization; however, this could come at a significant
loss to the utility for both the user and the platform
– as the content displayed would be less relevant on
average and hence incur fewer clicks and result in de-
creased attention from the user and less revenue for the
platform (see, e.g., [22]). Can we design personalization
algorithms that allow us to trade-off fairness with utility?
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(a) Existing algorithms can perpetuate systemic
bias by presenting different types of content to dif-
ferent types of users.
(b) Our proposed solution satisfies the fairness con-
straints and does not allow extreme differences in
the types of content presented to different users.
Figure 2: Different colors in the content represent different groups, e.g., ads for high vs low paying jobs.
Our fair content selection algorithm does not permit extreme biases while personalizing content.
We take a first step towards addressing this ques-
tion in a rigorous algorithmic manner; for concreteness
we describe our approach for personalized news feeds,
however it also applies to other personalization settings.
Users have different types and content is classified into
groups; often the types can be defined using a small
set of sensitive attributes such as race, gender or age
and the groups can similarly be defined by a small set
of properties. Current personalization algorithms, at
every time-step, select a piece of content for the user,1
and feedback is obtained in the form of whether they
click on, purchase or hover over the item. The goal of
the content selection algorithm is to select content for
each user in order to maximize the positive feedback
(and hence revenue) received. As this optimal selection
is a-priori unknown, the process is often modeled as an
online learning problem in which a probability distribu-
tion (from which one selects content) is maintained and
updated according to the feedback [21]. As such con-
tent selection algorithms learn more about a user, the
corresponding probability distributions become sparse
(i.e., concentrates the mass on a small subset of entries);
we propose that this is what leads to extreme personal-
ization in which content feeds skew entirely to a single
type of content.
1In order to create a complete feed, content is simply selected repeat-
edly to fill the screen as the user scrolls down. The formalization
does not change and hence, for clarity, we describe the process of
selecting a single piece of content.
To counter this, we introduce a notion of online group
fairness, in which we require that the probability distri-
bution from which content is sampled satisfies certain
fairness constraints at all time steps; this in turn ensures
that the probability vectors do not become sparse (or
specialize) and the content shown to different types
of users is similar with respect to the distribution of
groups that it is drawn from. We begin by considering
a metric that aims to measure the fairness of a con-
tent selection algorithm. We can then define a set of
constraints that, if satisfied by a content selection al-
gorithm, guarantee a level of fairness according to this
metric. We do not presume to define the constraints
as setting them appropriately would depend on the
application; instead, we take the constraints, types or
sensitive attributes and groups as input (in the same
spirit as [4, 24, 25]). Subsequently we invoke the bandit
convex optimization framework to solve the resulting
algorithmic problem of maximizing revenue while satis-
fying fairness constraints. Our work gives rise to initial
theoretical results which indicate that the structure of
fairness constraints can be leveraged to obtain regret
bounds that are not too far from the unconstrained
setting. Hence, this suggests that there is significant
potential to de-bias personalization algorithms without
a significant loss to utility.
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2 OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
2.1 Preliminaries
Algorithms for the general problem of displaying con-
tent to users largely fall within the multi-armed bandit
framework, and stochastic contextual bandits in partic-
ular [2]. At each time step t = 1, . . . ,T , a user views a
page (e.g., Facebook, twitter or google news), its type
(also known as its context) st ∈ S is given as input,
and one piece of content (or arm) at ∈ [k] must be
selected to be displayed. A random reward rat ,s t (here-
after denoted by r ta,s for readability), which depends
on both the given user type and the selected content
is then received. This reward captures resulting clicks,
purchases, or time spent viewing the given content and
depends not only on the type of user s (e.g., men may
be more likely to click on a sports article) but also on
the content a itself (e.g., some news articles have higher
quality or appeal than others).
More formally, at each time step t , a sample
(st , r t1,s , . . . , r tk,s )
is drawn from an unknown distribution D, the context
st ∈ S is revealed, the player selects an arm a ∈ [k] and
receives reward r ta,s ∈ [0, 1]. As is standard in the litera-
ture, we assume that the ra,s s are drawn independently
across a and t (and not necessarily s). The rewards ra′,s ′
for any a′ , a and s ′ , s are assumed to be unknown –
indeed, there is no way to observe what a user’s actions
would have been had a different piece of content been
displayed, or what a different user would have done.
An algorithm computes a probability distribution pt
over the arms based on the previous observations
(s1,a1, r 1a,s ), . . . , (st−1,at−1, r t−1a,s )
and the current user type st , and then selects arm at ∼
pt ; as pt depends on the context st , we often write
pt (st ) for clarity. The goal is to select pt (st )s in order
to maximize the cumulative rewards, and the efficacy
of such an algorithm is measured with respect to how
well it minimizes regret – the difference between the
algorithm’s reward and the reward obtained from the
(unknown) optimal policy. Formally, let f : S → [k] be
a mapping from contexts to arms, and let
f ⋆ := argmax
f
E(s, ®r )∼D[rf (s),s ];
i.e., f ⋆ is the policy that selects the best arm in ex-
pectation for each context. Then, the regret is defined
as
Regret := T · E(s, ®r )∼D[rf ⋆(s),s ] −
T∑
t=1
rat ,s t .
Note that the regret is a random variable as at depends
not only the draws from pt , but also on the realized
history of samplesHT = {(st ,at , r ta,s )}Tt=1.
2.2 Group Fairness
Towards defining group fairness in the setting above,
letG1, . . . ,Gд ⊆ [k] beд groups of content. For instance
theGis could form a partition (e.g., “republican-leaning”
news articles, “democratic-leaning”, and “neutral”). An
important feature of bandit algorithms, which ends up
being problematic for fairness, is that the probability dis-
tribution converges to the action with the best expected
reward for each context; i.e., the entire probability mass
in each context ends up on a single group. Thus dif-
ferent types of users may be shown very different ad
groups (Figure 2a), and, e.g., only show minimum-wage
jobs to disenfranchised populations.
A fairness metric. Given an algorithm for the prob-
lem as above, we consider the following metric for its
fairness. Let
α ti := 1 − sup
Ht−1
{
max
s1,s2∈S
(∑
a∈Gi
pta(s1) −
∑
a∈Gi
pta(s2)
)}
,
(1)
for all i ∈ [д] and t ∈ [T ], where pta(s) is the probability
with which the algorithm selects arm a at time t given
the context s andH t−1 is the realized (stochastic) his-
tory up to time t −1. Note that α ti ∈ [0, 1] and measures
how fair the algorithm is to group i until time t , with
α ti = 0 representing extreme unfairness and α ti = 1
representing perfect fairness. The supremum over all
possible stochastic trajectories (histories) ensures that
this metric measures the worst case discrepancy in the
probability mass assigned to the arms in group i for
every pair of distinct contexts. Given definition (1), we
define the fairness with respect to group i as
αi := min
t ∈[T ]
α ti , (2)
and the group fairness of the algorithm as
α := min
i ∈[k ]
αi .
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Depending up on how stringent one would like to be,
the supremum in (1) could be relaxed to an expecta-
tion over the history; however, the latter would allow
specific instances of the algorithm to select probabil-
ity distributions that are highly biased. One could also
consider variants that use different measures of discrep-
ancy across contexts of the probability mass assigned
to a group as opposed to the difference as in (1).
Our fairness constraints. Motivated by the met-
rics (1) and (2), we define our group fairness constraints
as follows
ℓi ≤
∑
a∈Gi
pta(s) ≤ ui ∀i ∈ [д],∀t ∈ [T ],∀s ∈ S. (3)
In other words, we ensure that the probability mass
placed on any given group is neither too high nor too
low at each time step. Clearly, an algorithm that satisfies
the fairness constraints has
αi ≥ 1 − (ui − ℓi )
fairness with respect to group i by definition. As dis-
cussed above, rather than specifying the values of uis
and ℓis ourselves, we allow them to be specified as input
as appropriate values may vary significantly depending
on the application or desired result. Having the uis and
ℓis as part of the input to the algorithm allows one to
control the extent of group fairness depending on the
application.
Unlike ignoring user types entirely, our constraints
still allow for personalization across groups. For in-
stance, if the groups are republican (R) vs democrat
(D) articles, and the user types are known republicans
(r) or democrats (d), we may require that ptR(·) ≤ 0.75
and ptD(·) ≤ 0.75 for all t . This ensures that extreme
polarization cannot occur – at least 25% of the articles a
republican is presented with will be democrat-leaning.
Despite these constraint, personalization at the group
level can still occur, e.g., by letting ptR(r) = 0.75 and
ptR(d) = 0.25. Furthermore, this allows for complete per-
sonalization within a group – the republican-leaning
articles shown to republicans and democrats may differ;
this is crucial for our setting as the utility maximizing
articles for republicans vs democrats, within a group,
may differ.
To the best of our knowledge, this notion of fairness
is novel and addresses the concerns in the motivating
examples. In a different context onemay seek a different
notion of fairness. For instance, if the options are people
rather than news stories, one would want to be fair to
each individual and such notions of online individual
fairness have recently been developed [14]. Thus, it is
the particulars of the online personalization of content
that motivates this definition of group fairness.
2.3 Algorithmic Results
Group fair regret. We measure an algorithm’s per-
formance against the best fair solution.2 We say that a
distribution p is fair if it satisfies the upper and lower
bound constraints in (3), and let C be the set of all such
distributions. Let B be the set of functions д : S →
[0, 1]k such that д(s) ∈ C; i.e., all д ∈ B satisfy the
fairness constraints. Further, we let
д⋆ := argmax
д∈B
E(s, ®r )∼D[rд(s),s ];
i.e., д⋆ is the policy that selects the best arm in expecta-
tion for each context. An algorithm is said to be fair if
it only selects pt (st ) ∈ C. Thus, the fair regret for such
an algorithm can be defined as
FairRegret := T · E(s, ®r )∼D[rд⋆(s),s ] −
T∑
t=1
rat ,s t .
Regret bounds. We show how techniques devel-
oped in the context of stochastic bandit optimization,
along with the special structure of the constraint set
C, can yield a (roughly) poly logT regret guarantee via
an efficient algorithm. For each arm a ∈ [k] and each
context s ∈ S, let its mean reward be µa,s . We first
consider the case of a single context (|S| = 1) and then
briefly discuss how this can be extended to the gen-
eral case using standard techniques. In this case, the
unknown parameters are the expectations of each arm
µa for a ∈ [k]. In particular, we rely on an algorithm
and analysis developed in [5]; restated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 2.1. There is a polynomial time algorithm
that, given the description of C and the sequence of re-
wards, obtains the following regret bound:
E [FairRegret] = O
(
k3 log3T
γ
)
,
where the expectation is taken over the histories and at ∼
pt , and γ depends on (µa)a∈[k ] and C as defined in (4).
2The unconstrained regret may be arbitrarily bad, e.g., ifui = ε ≪ 1
for the arm with the best reward.
Fair Personalization FAT/ML, 2017, Nova Scotia, Canada
The quantity γ is the difference between the maximum
and the second maximum of the expected reward with
respect to the µs over the vertices of the polytope C.
Formally, let V (C) denote the set of vertices of C and
v⋆ := arg max
v ∈V (C)
∑
a∈[k ]
µava .
Then,
γ :=
∑
a∈[k ]
µav
⋆
a − max
v ∈V (C)\v⋆
∑
a∈[k ]
µava . (4)
For general convex sets,γ can be 0 and the regret bound
can at best only be
√
T [5]. The fact that our fairness
constraints imply that C is a polytope implies that, un-
less there are degeneracies, γ is non-zero.
Further, we can quickly obtain quantitative bounds
on γ in our setting assuming some structure on the
groups. Here, we present a rough sketch of these results.
To start with, let
Ta := {i ∈ [д] : a ∈ Gi }
be the set of properties that arm a has and let
D := max
a∈[k ]
|Ta |.
In the simplest case of practical interest, D = 1, i.e., the
groups of arms are disjoint. Here, we can argue that the
constraints defining a v ∈ V (C) can be chosen so that
the corresponding matrix of equalities that determines
it is totally unimodular. Let µa = Ma/M for some posi-
tive integers Ma ,M and assume that Ma , Ma′ for all
a , a′ ∈ [k]. Similarly, let ℓi = Li/N an ui = Ui/N be
their rational representation. By randomly perturbing
Lis andUis we can ensure that v⋆ is unique with high
probability; implying that γ , 0. The unimodularity
property for D = 1 implies that γ ≥ 1MN . This is be-
cause a vertexv = A−1b whereA is a totally unimodular
matrix and b is a vector consisting of ℓis, uis, 1 or 0.
Hence, if the numbers ℓi and ui are not too small or too
large, our fairness constraints result in a sufficiently
largeγ , resulting in low regret. Note that even in the un-
constrained case, we cannot hope that γ ≥ 1/M as the
difference between the expected rewards of the best two
arms could be that small. When D > 1, the constraint
matrices corresponding to vertices may no longer to-
tally unimodular. However, as each arm appears in at
most D groups, we can upper bound its determinant
by roughly Dд ; this gives a lower bound of Dд in the
denominator of the coordinates of any vertex. Conse-
quently, one can extend the above argument to prove
that if γ is nonzero, then γ ≥ 1Dд 1MN .
The result in Theorem 2.1 can be easily extended
to the case of |S| > 1 by running, for instance, the
algorithm for each context separately; see Theorem
4.1 in [2]. The regret bounds worsen by |S|. As we
anticipate |S| to be a small as we only need to be fair
with respect to sensitive attributes (e.g., gender or race)
as opposed to all contexts.
The definitions of fairness and the constraints can
also be applied without modification to the adversar-
ial regime. The constrained problem then falls in the
regime of bandit convex optimization [12] – we omit
the details.
3 RELATEDWORK
There have been studies proposing notions of group
fairness such as statistical parity and disparate impact
[9, 15, 25], they apply to the offline problem; in our
setting this would correspond to enforcing pT (s) to be
roughly the same for all s , but would leave the interme-
diary pt (s) for t < T unrestricted. A subtle point is that
most notions of (offline) group fairness primarily con-
sider the selection or classification of groups of users;
in our context, while the goal is still fairness towards
users, the selection is over content. However, as the
constraints necessary to attain fairness remain on the
selection process, we use the terminology online group
fairness to highlight these parallels.
A recent work [14] defined a notion of online indi-
vidual fairness which restricts pt s so that all arms are
treated equally by only allowing the probability of one
arm to be more than another if we are reasonably cer-
tain that it is better than the other. When the arms
correspond to users and not content such individual
fairness is indeed crucial, but for the personalized set-
ting the requirement is both too strong (we are only
concerned with groups of content) and too weak (it still
allows for convergence to different groups for different
contexts).
Other constrained bandit settings that encode global
knapsack-like constraints (and locally place no restric-
tion on pt ) have also been considered; see, e.g., [1].
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4 DISCUSSION & FUTUREWORK
In summary, motivated by personalization, we initi-
ate the study of group fairness in online settings. We
propose a definition for group fairness, and define con-
straints for online algorithms that ensure fairness guar-
antees. Our constraints suffice to ensure group fairness
but may not be necessary; exploring this remains an
important open question. Further, we present an algo-
rithmic framework for group fairness in online learn-
ing by appealing to the contextual bandit optimization
framework. We show that well-known results from the
bandit convex optimization literature can be used along
with the structure of the fairness constraint set in or-
der to obtain poly-logarithmic regret in the stochastic
bandit setting. On a theoretical front, it would be an
important avenue of future work to develop specialized
algorithms for such constraints that optimize both the
regret and the running time.
This work applies to many personalization settings.
For instance, in online advertising, ad agencies can se-
lect what type of user profiles they desire an ad to be
shown to. Additionally, the ad exchange (i.e., the plat-
form that matches ads to users) further learns about
which ads different types of users are more likely to
click on and uses this information in its decision-making
process (see [19] for an overview). This personalization
leads to higher utility, efficiency, and hence revenue
[8], but has similar problems with regard to biases; re-
cent work has shown that the gender of a user affects
whether ads for high- vs. low-paying jobs are displayed
[6, 23]. Our formalization and approach applies directly
to the online advertising setting.
One implicit assumption was that the groups of con-
tent and types of users were given. In most personaliza-
tion settings we would expect the types of users to be
known – in particular, the sensitive attributes (such as
gender, race, income, etc.) would already be encoded as
features. More generally one could cluster the feature
space into types depending on the application. Content,
however, may not be already clustered. While in some
settings, such as online ads, we may already have the
necessary features as they are used as part of the adver-
tising exchange, in others settings, such as news feeds,
this may not be the case. Here one practical challenge
would be to additionally set up the necessary classifica-
tion tools in order to group content appropriately.
Another key question is which constraints to apply
to which groups. In order to ensure exact fairness, all
types of users see the same fraction ci of content group
i . This can be achieved by letting ℓi = ui = ci for
all i . In such cases, personalization can occur within
groups of content, but not accross. While this may be
feasible in some settings, in others this may come at a
significant loss to revenue and hence a balance between
fairness and utility may have to be struck; what this
balance looks like is an important question to study for
individual applications. Furthermore, the question of
how to determine the optimal constraints ci (or ℓi ,ui
more generally) is not obvious.
The most important open direction is to understand
how such fair algorithms behave in practice. Given a
set of constraints, how fair are the resulting algorithms
(according to the fairness metric) for natural reward dis-
tributions? Perhaps more importantly, how much does
fair personalized content affect user’s perceptions and
decisions, in particular as a function of the imposed con-
straints? Setting up such a field study would be crucial
in order to determine the efficacy of this approach.
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